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Abstract—In this paper we discuss the ability of channel
codes to enhance cryptographic secrecy. Toward that end, we
present the secrecy metric of degrees of freedom in an attacker’s
knowledge of the cryptogram, which is similar to equivocation.
Using this notion of secrecy, we show how a specific practical
channel coding system can be used to hide information about the
ciphertext, thus increasing the difficulty of cryptographic attacks.
The system setup is the wiretap channel model where transmitted
data traverse through independent packet erasure channels
with public feedback for authenticated ARQ (Automatic Repeat
reQuest). The code design relies on puncturing nonsystematic
low-density parity-check codes with the intent of inflicting an
eavesdropper with stopping sets in the decoder. Furthermore,
the design amplifies errors when stopping sets occur such that a
receiver must guess all the channel-erased bits correctly to avoid
an expected error rate of one half in the ciphertext. We extend
previous results on the coding scheme by giving design criteria
that reduces the effectiveness of a maximum-likelihood attack to
that of a message-passing attack. We further extend security
analysis to models with multiple receivers and collaborative
attackers. Cryptographic security is enhanced in all these cases
by exploiting properties of the physical-layer. The enhancement
is accurately presented as a function of the degrees of freedom
in the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the ciphertext, and is even
shown to be present when eavesdroppers have better channel
quality than legitimate receivers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Cryptography and the Physical Layer
MAny cryptosystems in place today measure securitycomputationally. If all known attacks are computation-
ally intractable, then the system is deemed to be secure. The
chief failings of this notion of security are the assumptions
placed on the attacker. First, it is assumed that the attacker
has limited resources to confront the problem, even if those
resources are state of the art. Second, it is assumed that the
attacker uses attacks which are publicly known, even though
a better attack may exist. Claude Shannon addressed these
shortcomings by defining the notion of perfect secrecy [1].
If a secret message M is encrypted into a cryptogram E
using a secret key K , then perfect secrecy is achieved if
H(M |E) = H(M). Shannon also proved that perfect secrecy
is only attainable if the key is at least as long as M , which is
clearly impractical. However, perfect secrecy also makes the
limiting assumption that an attacker has access to an error-free
cryptogram, which may not be the case in practice.
Aaron Wyner later introduced the wiretap channel model,
along with a new condition for secrecy [2]. Let a message M
of length k be encoded into a codeword X of length n, and
then transmitted. The rate of the encoder is k/n. A legitimate
receiver obtains Y over the main channel denoted Qm, and an
eavesdropper obtains Z over a wiretap channel denoted Qw.
The secrecy condition is
lim
k→∞
I(M ;Z)
k
= 0. (1)
Wyner showed that for rates up to the secrecy capacity Cs,
encoders and decoders exist which can satisfy (1) and also
achieve arbitrarily low probability of error for intended parties
when X → Y → Z is a Markov chain. This is known as the
degraded wiretap channel model. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] later
generalized these results removing the degraded restriction, but
still showing that Cs > 0, only if Qm is less noisy than Qw.
Understanding of the theoretically achievable secrecy rates
of communication systems has continued to grow, as outlined
in e.g. [4], [5], and [6]. But another of the main challenges
in this area has been the design of practical systems which
achieve the secrecy rates indicated by the theory. These
systems exploit noise in the channel at the physical layer of
the communications system. Practical designs maximizing the
information-theoretic secrecy are not trivial. Most currently
suffer from one or more of several drawbacks. For instance,
code designs are oftentimes a function of specific channel pa-
rameters (channel state information or CSI) seen by legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers. Without accurate CSI, the results
of these systems are not guaranteed; therefore, channels with
varying or unknowable parameters present design issues. Other
codes offer secrecy for only specific types of channels, or
only when the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded. Still other
designs are impractical in the real world due to design com-
plexity, necessary side information for legitimate decoding, or
other limitations. Finally, the most glaring shortcoming of any
scheme which derives security from the physical layer of a
communications system, is that if an eavesdropper has a better
channel than a legitimate receiver, the scheme is likely to fail.
The extreme case is when an eavesdropper has a noise-free
channel and Z = X . Clearly this necessitates any physical-
layer security scheme to be coupled with some other protection
in order to maintain secrecy in the worst case.
B. Main Contributions
The intent of this paper is to develop the notion of com-
bined security due to cryptography and channel coding, thus
providing a more complete security solution. To accomplish
this goal, we cast coding into a cryptographic enhancement
role, and seek to prevent an attacker from obtaining a noise-
free cryptogram using channel coding. We present a new
2security metric for physical-layer schemes; namely, degrees
of freedom D in an attacker’s knowledge of the cryptogram.
As a comparison, if bits in M are uniformly zero or one
and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), then perfect
secrecy implies D = k. In fact we show that H(X |Z) = E[D]
for a specific case. Our notion of physical-layer security using
D addresses the effectiveness of attacks on a cryptographic
layer. To be more precise, our notion of security answers the
practical question, how does the complexity of an attack on
the cryptography change without perfect knowledge of the
cryptogram?
It has been shown previously using correlation attacks on
stream ciphers that certain cryptographic attacks are still pos-
sible even on noisy cryptograms, although a threshold on the
noise level exists such that errors beyond the threshold cause
the attack to fail [7], [8], [9], [10]. Practical schemes should
provide enough confusion to exploit even the smallest amount
of noise in an eavesdropper’s received data to cause failure
of these attacks on the cryptographic layer. Such systems
should be robust to varying channel parameters, imperfect
CSI at the encoder, and nondegraded system models. In fact,
good designs still offer security enhancement to cryptography,
even when attackers have an advantage in signal quality over
legitimate receivers. Of course, all of this must be done while
guaranteeing reliable communication between friendly parties.
Therefore, along with the new metric, this paper also
analyzes combined cryptographic and physical-layer security
in a practical coding scheme using degrees of freedom to
characterize security. In [11], this scheme was shown to inflict
a passive eavesdropper using a message-passing decoder with
stopping sets with very high probability when a legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper view transmitted data through
statistically independent packet erasure channels (PEC). The
scheme relies on a nonsystematic low-density parity-check
(LDPC) code design, with puncturing and interleaving steps
in the encoder. Legitimate receivers are given access to an
authenticated public feedback channel for Automatic Repeat-
reQuest (ARQ). In this paper, we broaden the security analysis
of the scheme given in [11] by addressing the following points.
• Degrees of Freedom: The system security is analyzed
using the new metric. Computational secrecy is shown
to grow exponentially with E[D], which is also shown to
be equal to H(X |Z) for the prescribed encoder.
• Encoder Description: End-to-end details of the encoder
and decoder are provided, as well as simulation results
which match theoretical expectations.
• Optimization: Design criteria are specified to maximize
the degrees of freedom in the maximum-likelihood attack
as well as the message-passing attack. This involves
comparison of irregular LDPC codes with regular LDPC
codes.
• Extensions: Security results are made general so as to
apply to multiple receivers and multiple collaborative
attackers. Ultimately, bounds on the increase in computa-
tional secrecy of an underlying cryptosystem are specified
when the physical-layer encoding system is employed.
Ultimately, this scheme has very few design constraints, offers
enhanced cryptographic secrecy over a wide range of CSI
parameters, and requires no secret key and no rate reduction
in data transmission.
C. Related Works
Our encoder makes use of fundamental practical design
ideas which have been shown to offer secrecy. For example,
our encoder employs nonsystematic LDPC codes in order
to hide information bits and magnify coding errors. Secrecy
properties of these codes have been studied in [12]. We further
employ intentional puncturing of encoded bits, a technique
shown to offer security in [13], [14]. Our scheme punctures
with the goal of inducing stopping sets in an eavesdropper’s
received data. As a result, every transmitted bit is crucial for
decoding. Our intent is to punish an eavesdropper for every
missing piece of information. Finally, in order to distribute
erasures throughout the data set, the encoder interleaves coded
bits among several transmitted packets. Similar ideas of in-
terleaving coded symbols have been used in [15], [16] in
conjunction with wiretap codes developed in [17] to offer
secrecy to various systems. The works [18], [19] give results
for ARQ and feedback wiretap systems.
It can be argued that the first practical secrecy coding
scheme was presented by Ozarow and Wyner in an extension
of the original wiretap paper [4]. Here the general idea
of partitioning a group code into cosets to achieve secrecy
was first presented. This technique was shown to apply to
LDPC codes much more recently in [17], and achieves the
secrecy condition in (1) for noiseless main channels when
the wiretap channel is either a binary erasure channel (BEC)
or a binary symmetric channel (BSC). This work in LDPC
codes for secrecy has been furthered in [20], where large-
girth LDPC codes are considered, and shown to meet the
secrecy constraint in (1) for noiseless main channel and BEC
wiretap channel. A stronger notion of secrecy than (1) is also
achieved for these codes in certain cases. Finally, it should
be noted that Arıkan’s polar codes [21] can offer secrecy for
general symmetric channels, although code construction is an
issue for non-erasure channels. Schemes have been presented
in [22] and [23] which achieve the secrecy capacity under the
condition in (1), although these schemes only offer secrecy
for degraded wiretap channels. Furthermore, design of these
codes is heavily contingent on perfect CSI at the encoder.
Although our codes can be shown to achieve (1) only
under certain puncturing criteria, the main contribution of the
coding scheme presented here is the cryptographic security
enhancements shown using degrees of freedom as a security
metric. Our scheme is robust against imperfect CSI, and
for that matter, undetected eavesdroppers. According to our
knowledge, it is also the first practical secrecy scheme which
can operate on the general wiretap channel (nondegraded case)
when both Qm and Qw are erasure channels.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section
II, we discuss the system model for which our encoder is
designed, which is an adaptation of the wiretap channel model
from [2]. The precise definition of degrees of freedom is also
given. Section III addresses background information regarding
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel model with feedback assuming packet erasure
channels for both the main channel Qm and the wiretap channel Qw .
LDPC codes and stopping sets. Our novel encoder and decoder
designs are presented in Sections IV and V, respectively. Anal-
ysis of the security inherent in the system is then completed
in Section VI for various scenarios, ultimately culminating
in the most general case which encompasses multiple users
and collaborating eavesdroppers. Finally, bounds regarding
enhancements of cryptographic security are presented in Sec-
tion VII along with end-to-end simulations of the system.
Conclusions are provided in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEGREES OF FREEDOM
We begin by presenting the wiretap channel model [24]
with the addition of feedback in Fig. 1. A user named
Alice wishes to transmit an encrypted binary message M =
(m1,m2, . . . ,mL) to a legitimate receiver named Bob, where
mi = (mi1,m
i
2, . . . ,m
i
k) ∈ M for i = 1, 2, . . . , L. It will be
helpful to think of M as being broken up into L blocks of
length k, where k is the dimension of the encoder to follow.
The final block mL can be filled by concatenating random
bits if needed. Let us also define the blocklength n of the
encoder. Then the coding rate is k/n. To be clear, n is the
length of a codeword after it has been punctured. We will
also assume that M has been compressed, so that all possible
bit combinations are equally likely in the alphabet M. Prior to
transmission, Alice encodes M , resulting in a collection of η
packets X = (x1, x2, . . . , xη) for transmission. Bob receives
the packets as Y through Qm, a PEC with probability of
erasure δ. An eavesdropper named Eve obtains the packets Z ,
although through Qw, an independent PEC with probability of
erasure ǫ. An obvious extension of this model is to consider
correlated erasures in Qm and Qw; however, in this paper we
always assume erasures are statistically independent. Finally,
M˜ and Mˆ are the respective estimates of M by Bob and Eve.
The encoder and decoder exploit the independent nature of
erased packets across Qm and Qw. Of course, the system must
guarantee that M˜ = M , while at the same time making Eve
as ignorant as possible. The authenticated feedback channel
available to Bob plays a key role in accomplishing both
of these endeavors. This public noiseless channel is used
to request the retransmission of erased packets. Since it is
authenticated, Alice is able to deduce whether Bob sent the
request, and can detect any tampering with the data [25], which
restricts Eve to passive status [26]. Requests by Bob are public,
and there is no secret key employed at the physical layer. The
sole source of confusion for Eve is her own naturally occurring
erasure pattern across Qw.1
As mentioned in Section I, we define physical-layer security
for this system with the cryptographic layer in mind. Crypto-
graphic attacks often assume an attacker has the luxury of an
error-free version of M (or even some of the plaintext), but
our design aims to prevent this from occurring, by creating
degrees of freedom in the attacker’s knowledge of M .
Definition 1. The number of degrees of freedom in a received
codeword is a random variable D which takes on the number
of encoded symbols for which an eavesdropper has no infor-
mation. Therefore, the probabilities of all symbol values on
these D symbols are equally likely.
For binary codes with D = d, a codeword of length n can be
any of 2d equally likely codewords, each mapping to a unique
k-bit message in M. Since we assume that the attacker knows
the encoder, the maximum value of D is k, and can be shown
to have an information-theoretic definition. Since an attacker
has no knowledge of these bits, an average of 2E[D]−1 guesses
must be made to obtain them. Using this reasoning, the goals
of our physical-layer design are: first, to ensure that D = 0 for
Bob so that M˜ = M ; second, to make D as large as possible
for Eve; and third, to ensure that attacks on the cryptogram
fail if Mˆ 6= M .
III. LDPC CODES AND STOPPING SETS
We employ LDPC codes [27] and exploit the phenomenon
of stopping sets to obtain security from the physical layer.
This section provides limited background of LDPC codes and
stopping sets in order to establish the foundation upon which
to present our encoder.
Let us define a general binary LDPC code C with block-
length N , and dimension k. Note that this k is identical to
k from section II, but N the blocklength of the LDPC code,
is different from n the blocklength of the encoder because
n is the codeword length after puncturing. The parity check
matrix H fully defines the code, and is N − k ×N . We will
find it helpful to think of H in terms of its corresponding
Tanner graph GC [28], [29]. The set of variable nodes is
V = (v1, v2, . . . , vN ), while the set of check nodes is
U = (u1, u2, . . . , uN−k). Variable nodes correspond to the N
bits in a codeword. Checks correspond to rows in H , where
the set of bits that participate in the check ui is denoted
Ni = {j : Hi,j = 1} [28]. Then the ith check is calculated in
GF(2) as ui =
∑
j∈Ni
vj = 0. The notation Ni,j signifies all
bits in the ith check except the jth bit. The jth variable node
shares an edge with the ith check node in GC if and only if
j ∈ Ni. The Tanner graph for a simple example is shown in
Fig. 2.
Decoding of an LDPC codeword over a BEC can be
accomplished using maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding [30],
by solving a system of equations. However, the iterative
message-passing (MP) decoder is commonly used due to its
computational efficiency. We briefly explain both decoders.
1It is noted that results in Section VI are provided for this system, as well
as the more general model which allows an arbitrary number of legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers.
4v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
u1
u2
u3
1
0
e
e
0
e
e
1
1
1
Fig. 2. Tanner graph for MP decoding over the BEC with a highlighted
stopping set due to erasures at variable nodes v3 and v5.
A. Maximum-Likelihood Decoding
Let us consider an LDPC codeword x ∈ C transmitted over
a BEC and let y denote the received codeword. Note that
xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1, e} where e signifies an erased
bit. We let K denote the set of known bits in y, and K¯ denote
the set of erased bits in y. Furthermore, HK and HK¯ can
be understood to be matrices formed by the columns of H
indexed by K and K¯, respectively. Similarly, xK and xK¯ are
vectors composed of only the bits indexed by the respective
sets K and K¯.
Clearly, 0 = HxT = HKxTK + HK¯xTK¯, where xK = yK,
and thus HKxTK = zT is known. The maximum likelihood
decoder must then solve for the channel-erased bits xK¯ using
the system of equations given by
HK¯x
T
K¯ = z
T . (2)
This system has a unique solution when the erased bits are
such that the columns of HK¯ are linearly independent [31].
We can obtain a bound from this statement which we will use
to analyze security in the worst-case.
Proposition 1. For a linear code C with blocklength N and
dimension k, the ML decoder over the BEC cannot have a
unique solution if the number of erasures exceeds N − k, that
is if |K¯| > N − k.
Proof: The rank of HK¯ equals the number of linearly
independent rows or columns of the matrix ([32], pg. 244).
Since N − k is the number of rows in H , the rank of HK¯ can
never exceed N−k, and thus the ML decoder cannot produce
a unique solution when |K¯| > N − k.
In fact, when the number of erasures exceeds N − k, the
system in (2) will be such that the degrees of freedom in the
ML decoder DML ≥ |K¯|−(N−k), where we achieve equality
if there are N − k linearly independent columns in HK¯ [30].
In any case, DML is equal to the difference in the number of
erased bits, and the number of linearly independent columns
of HK¯, and is zero if this difference is negative. This definition
clearly satisfies the notion of degrees of freedom from Defini-
tion 1 for this decoder. Thus we see that the effectiveness of
the decoder is strictly bounded by the redundancy of the code.
While faster methods have been discovered for solving a linear
system of equations, the straightforward decoder is known to
have complexity ((1 − R)β + γδ)δ2N3, where R is the rate
of the code, β and γ are constants which are also a function
of the elimination algorithm chosen to solve the system of
equations, δ is the erasure probability in the channel, and N
is the blocklength of the code [30].
B. Message-Passing Decoding
Let C, x, and y hold the same definitions as for the ML
decoder. The MP decoder is an iterative decoder based on
the Tanner graph representation of C. The decoding process
passes messages between U and V along the edges of GC . One
version of the decoder is given as Algorithm 1 (adapted from
[31]). The number of degrees of freedom in the MP decoder
DMP is the cardinality of the smallest set of bit values that
must be supplied in order to decode all remaining bits. If the
decoder succeeds, then DMP = 0. Clearly, this maintains the
definition of degrees of freedom given in Definition 1 when
restricted to this decoder, because any bit combination of these
DMP values decodes to a valid codeword, and each is equally
likely without further information. A bound on the correction
capabilities of the MP decoder is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. The MP decoder over the BEC can correct no
more than N − k erasures.
Proof: In Algorithm 1, each check node can correct at
most one variable node, and |U | = N − k.
The MP decoder is suboptimal compared with the ML
decoder, although the MP decoder has linear complexity in
the blocklength [28]. A more detailed comparison of the two
decoders is offered in [33].
Algorithm 1 Message-Passing Decoder over the BEC [31].
1: Initialize: For yi 6= e, set vi = yi and declare all such
variable nodes as known.
2: if (No variable nodes are known and no check node has
degree one) then
3: Output the (possibly partial) codeword and stop.
4: else
5: Delete all known variable nodes along with their
adjacent edges.
6: end if
7: For each variable node vj connected to a degree one check
node ui, declare vj as known and set vj =
∑
k∈Ni,j
vk.
Jump to 2.
C. Stopping Sets
In order to make D as large as possible for our system when
an eavesdropper uses an MP decoder, we would like to design
the encoder block from Fig. 1 so that every bit erased by the
5channel adds a degree of freedom to the decoder. Stopping
sets provide a means of accomplishing this task.
Definition 2 (Di, et. al. [34]). A stopping set is a set S ⊆ V
such that all check nodes in N(S) are connected to S by at
least two edges, where N(S) signifies the neighborhood of S
and is defined as the set of all adjacent nodes to any member
of S in GC .
Notice that the empty set, by definition, is a stopping set, as
is any union of stopping sets. Thus, any set of variable nodes
has a unique maximal stopping set in it.2 See Fig. 2 for a
simple example; clearly the erasures cannot be resolved using
Algorithm 1. This gives way to the following lemma, proved
in [34].
Lemma 1 (Di et. al. [34], Lemma 1.1). Let G be the Tanner
graph defined by the parity check matrix H of a binary linear
block code C, and assume that C is used to transmit over
the BEC. Let A be the set of erased bits in the received
codeword. Then, using Algorithm 1 on G, the set of erasures
which remain after decoding comprise the unique maximal
stopping set in A.
Since stopping sets cause the MP decoder to fail, puncturing
in the encoder will be done with an attempt to inflict Eve with
stopping sets. However, the ML decoder will still succeed,
even in the presence of stopping sets, as long as the erased
bits have linearly independent columns in H . We account for
both decoders in our design by using a particular ensemble of
LDPC codes where DMP can be made equal to DML, thus
ensuring secrecy regardless of the decoder used by Eve. The
simplicity of MP decoding is also preserved for all legitimate
receivers.3
IV. ENCODER
The encoder design is based on the fact that I(M ;Z) ≤
I(M ;X) because processing cannot increase information, and
M → X → Z is a Markov process [37]. The key idea in
the decoder is to reduce X to the decoding threshold. In
other words, X can be used to recover M by design, but
if any erasures remain in Z following transmission, unique
decodability is not possible. Proper design maximizes D for
Eve. The stages of encoding are portrayed in Fig. 3, where
each stage fulfills a specific purpose within the overall goals
of obtaining secrecy and reliability. The following principles
are addressed in the design of this encoder.
• Bits of M are hidden from immediate access in the
decoded words using nonsystematic LDPC codes.
• Scrambling prior to coding magnifies errors due to the
physical layer of the communication system.
• The error-correction capabilities of the LDPC code are
restricted by intentional puncturing of encoded bits. (Bob
obtains reliability through ARQ, rather than error correc-
tion.)
2For our purposes, we will sometimes ignore the empty set as a stopping
set and say that a set A contains no stopping sets, meaning that the maximal
stopping set in A is ∅.
3For further information on stopping sets as they relate to LDPC code
ensembles, see [35] and [36].
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length k
B
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length n
X
η packets
size αL
Fig. 3. Detailed block diagram of the encoder. Number and size of blocks
or packets are indicated at each step.
• Bits from encoded blocks are interleaved amongst several
transmitted packets so that a single erased packet results
in erasures in many encoded blocks of data.
A. Nonsystematic LDPC Codes
Recall from Section II that M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mL), where
mi = (mi1,m
i
2, . . . ,m
i
k) ∈ M for i = 1, 2, . . . , L. These L
blocks of encrypted message form the input to the nonsys-
tematic LDPC encoder with blocklength N and dimension k.
The output of the LDPC encoder B is given as L codewords
of length N , denoted as B = (b1, b2, . . . , bL) where each
vector bi = (bi1, b
i
2, . . . , b
i
N ). Certainly, if the code C were
systematic, then the bits of mi would appear explicitly in the
encoded block bi. For secrecy purposes, nonsystematic codes
are employed.
Nonsystematic LDPC coding is typically implemented as a
two stage process to improve encoder complexity [38], [39],
[12]. Let S be an invertible k×k scrambling matrix in GF(2),
and let G be a k×N systematic generator matrix. Let m be a
length-k message. Then our LDPC encoding process applies
the scrambling matrix to m as
m′ = mS. (3)
The data are then encoded using G by b = m′G to obtain a
length-N block of encoded data. Clearly at the decoder the
inverse operation first requires the bits of b to be obtained
through either MP or ML decoding. Since G is systematic, the
bits of m′ are explicit in b. The bits of m can then be found
by applying the inverse of S in the descrambling operation
m = m′S−1. (4)
This process amplifies errors in the decoding process as a
function of the sparsity of S−1. Note that S−1 can be obtained
through e.g. LU decomposition [32], with modifications for
GF(2). In our experience, randomly generated scrambling
matrices which are nonsingular are likely to have inverses with
just less than 50% of the entries equal to one on average. If
S matrices are randomly generated until one can be inverted
to obtain S−1, the resulting despreading operation is enough
to cause even a single error in m′ to result in roughly a 50%
error rate in m as shown in Section VII. Although this can
be made more precise, the result is intuitive because a bit in
m is a linear combination of bits in m′. Thus, if there are an
odd number of bits in error in a given combination of say mi,
then that bit will be in error. On average, the row weight in
S−1 is approximately k/2, and the expectation of k/2 bits in
error holds for any number of errors in m′.
6Since only one (S, S−1) pair need be used by the system,
the matrices can be generated off-line, which does not affect
encoding and decoding complexity. However, the complexity
of both the encoder and the decoder is increased due to the
matrix multiplications in (3) and (4). Both of these operations
are O(k3). General systematic encoder complexity is O(N2)
because G is not sparse by design [28], although improvements
can be made using appropriate preprocessing as outlined in
[31]. The encoding technique specified in [31] gives encoder
complexity of O(N+g2) where g is the gap in an approximate
lower triangular form of the parity check matrix and is less
than N − k. The complexities for the ML and MP decoders
are given in Sections III-A and III-B as O(N3) and O(N),
respectively.
B. Puncturing
The next step in the encoding process is to apply a punctur-
ing pattern to each codeword in B. Let the puncturing pattern
R ∈ V indicate which bits in each bi are to be punctured.
Recall that V is the set of variable nodes in the Tanner graph
GC . The punctured blocks P = (p1, p2, . . . , pL), where each
pi = (pi1, p
i
2, . . . , p
i
n) are shown in Fig. 3 to have length n,
which was defined in Section II to be the blocklength of the
encoder. All bits which are not punctured belong to the set Q
so that V = R+Q; therefore, the length of each block in P
is equal to |Q| = n. The puncturing pattern is chosen in order
to induce stopping sets in an eavesdropper’s received data.
Definition 3. A puncturing pattern R is deemed acceptable
if and only if there are no stopping sets in R, and R + v
contains some nonempty stopping set Sv for every variable
node v ∈ Q.
Such a set R can be constructed using the random technique
outlined in Algorithm 2, which also calls Algorithm 3 in
order to check for stopping sets in a computationally tractable
manner [11].
Algorithm 2 Finds an acceptable puncturing pattern R within
the set of all variable nodes V .
1: Initialize: R = v, for a randomly chosen v ∈ V , and
Q = ∅.
2: if (V \(R ∪Q) 6= ∅) then
3: Choose another v randomly from V \(R ∪Q).
4: Run Algorithm 3 with A = R + v to check for
stopping sets.
5: if (R+ v has a stopping set, i.e. Algorithm 3 returns
true) then
6: Q = Q+ v.
7: else
8: R = R+ v.
9: end if
10: Jump to 2.
11: else
12: Terminate.
13: end if
Algorithm 3 Checks for the existence of stopping sets in a
subset of variable nodes, A ⊆ V [11].
1: Initialize: S = A
2: if (S 6= ∅) then
3: Induce subgraph G′ in G using (S ∪N(S)).
4: if (∃ a check node in G′ with degree 1) then
5: Delete variable nodes from S which are adjacent
to check nodes of degree 1 in G′, jump to 2.
6: else
7: Return true. S is the maximal nonempty stop-
ping set in A.
8: end if
9: else
10: Return false. There is no nonempty stopping set in
A.
11: end if
Lemma 2. The output of Algorithm 2 is always an acceptable
puncturing pattern R as defined in Definition 3.
Proof: We must first show that upon completion of
Algorithm 2, there are no stopping sets in R. Assume for
a contradiction that R has a stopping set. Then there is a bit
v ∈ R which when added to R during the construction process,
caused a stopping set to first appear. Then by Algorithm 2,
v /∈ R. This provides the contradiction. It remains to be proved
that Algorithm 3 operates as expected.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 3 always returns true when A has
a nonempty stopping set, and always returns false otherwise.
Proof of Proposition: Suppose that the bits in A were
actually erasures over the BEC, and Algorithm 1 was used
to decode. Realize that erasures recovered in the ith iteration
of Algorithm 1 correspond exactly to the nodes deleted in
the ith iteration of Algorithm 3. If all bits can be resolved
using MP decoding then all nodes will be deleted in Algorithm
3, and false is returned. If, however, MP decoding returns a
partial codeword, then Algorithm 3 will return true because
all remaining bits have degree greater than one in the induced
subgraph G′. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the remaining nodes
comprise the maximal stopping set of A.
To complete the proof of Lemma 2, we must also show that
for any v ∈ Q, R + v has a nonempty stopping set. Since in
Algorithm 2 every v ∈ Q is such that for some subset R′ ⊆ R,
R′ + v has a stopping set, therefore R+ v has a stopping set
for any v ∈ Q.
Thus, puncturing according to R in each bi for i =
1, 2, . . . , L, guarantees that every bit in each pi is crucial for
successful MP decoding.
Complexity of Algorithm 2 is linear in the blocklength N ,
because it chooses N − 1 bits in a random order, and calls
Algorithm 3 after each choice. The complexity of Algorithm
3 in the worst case, is quadratic in |U | = N − k the number
of check nodes in GC . Line 5 of the algorithm will be
repeated a maximum of
∑|U|
i=1 i =
|U|2+|U|
2 times if a single
node is deleted each time the line is executed. Therefore, the
complexity of finding an acceptable puncturing pattern R is
7at most quadratic in |U |, and linear in N , i.e. has complexity
O(N |U |2). Thus the algorithm can be used in practical system
design to compute R off-line.
C. Regular vs. Irregular Codes
The overall rate k/n of the nonsystematic and punctured
code is a function of the rate of the systematic LDPC code,
and |R|. Simulations have shown that the size of R is very
much a function of the degree distribution on C, although the
exact relationship is still unknown.
Example 1. Let C be a regular rate-1/2 code with N = 1000,
wc = 4, and wr = 8, where wc and wr are the fixed column
and row weights of the parity check matrix, respectively.
The size of |R| appears to be Gaussian-distributed for this
family of codes with a mean size of approximately 436, with
variance roughly equal to 15. Let us examine, however, an
irregular ensemble with the same rate and blocklength, but
having the following edge degree distribution pair: η(x) =
0.32660x+ 0.11960x2 + 0.18393x3 + 0.36988x4 on variable
node weights, and χ(x) = 0.78555x5 + 0.21445x6 on check
node weights (see [28] pg. 664), where H is formed using the
socket approach given in [30]. Here the distribution on |R|
is much tighter, ranging from 496 to 500. The size on R is
equal to 500 with probability roughly equal to 0.1, 499 with
probability around 0.56, and 498 with probability near 0.26.
Thus with some degree of confidence, we can claim that for
this rate-1/2 irregular code ensemble the random technique
given in Algorithm 2 yields a puncturing pattern with size
nearly equal (and equal in some cases) to N − k.
As a direct result, a puncturing pattern generated for the
irregular code of the example has a unique property. Namely,
that for some patterns DMP = DML.
Lemma 3. Let Rc denote the indices of the channel-erased
bits of pi, and DMP and DML denote the degrees of freedom
using MP decoding and ML decoding, respectively. If an ir-
regular LDPC code is employed over the BEC with intentional
puncturing determined by Algorithm 2 in which |R| = N − k,
then DML = DMP = |Rc|.
Proof: The ML portion of this lemma follows from
Proposition 1, i.e. that the system of equations in (2) can
resolve a maximum of N − k erasures. Since |R| = N − k,
any erasure by the channel is guaranteed to give a degree of
freedom in the decoder. The MP case is the same because by
Proposition 2, the MP decoder can correct at most N − k
erasures. Thus any bits erased by the channel (or perhaps
another set of bits of equal size) must be guessed in order
to decode. Therefore, the effectiveness of the ML decoder is
equal to that of the MP decoder when |R| = N − k.
It should be noted that if the sum of systematic bits in
R + Rc is less than D, a brute-force attack on these bits
might be more appealing to an attacker than decoding the
entire codeword. To cover this possibility, D can be thought
of as the minimum between the number of systematic bits
missing to the eavesdropper, and the degrees of freedom in the
decoder. Although, in practice the number of systematic bits
removed through puncturing or erased by the channel usually
exceeds the degrees of freedom in the decoder.
D. Interleaving
The role of the interleaver is to ensure that all packets
must be obtained error-free for successful decoding in any
and all encoded blocks. To do this, we construct a collection
of η packets to be transmitted X = (x1, x2, . . . , xη) in the
following manner. Alice defines α a small positive integer
which is assumed to divide n (not necessary but convenient
for notation and analysis) such that η = n/α, and the ith
packet is formed as
xi = (xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
αL)
= (p1(i−1)α+1, . . . , p
1
iα, p
2
(i−1)α+1, . . . , p
2
iα, . . . ,
pL(i−1)α+1, . . . , p
L
iα). (5)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , η. In words, we form the packet xi by
concatenating α bits from each encoded and punctured block
pj for j = 1, 2, . . . , L. Therefore, a single erased packet causes
α erasures in each punctured block at the decoder. Since we
have designed R so that any erasure of a bit in pj results in
MP decoding failure, we can be assured that any erased packet
will cause all L blocks to fail in the MP decoder due to this
interleaving. If R can be designed so that |R| = N − k, then
the same result holds for ML decoding by Lemma 3.
Corollary 1. If |R| = N − k and packets are formed
according to (5), then the number of degrees of freedom in
the ith codeword is DiML = DiMP = |Ric| = α|Rp| for
i = 1, 2, . . . , L, where Rp is a list of all erased packets.
Furthermore, DiML = D
j
MP∀i, j.
Proof: The first part is trivial and follows directly from
Lemma 3 and (5). We see that DiML = DjMP because a
missing packet means exactly α degrees of freedom in each
block, irrespective of decoder choice.
V. DECODER FOR LEGITIMATE USERS
The decoder for legitimate users is simply the inverse of all
encoder operations. A user can decode all data as long as every
packet is received error-free. Legitimate users make use of
the authenticated feedback channel to request retransmission
of packets erased in the main channel during transmission.
Time delay and queueing aspects of ARQ protocols are well-
addressed in the literature, e.g. [40] and its references. The
decoding process is shown pictorially in Fig. 4. Once all
packets are obtained in Y , the bits are deinterleaved back into
their intentionally punctured codewords P˜ . The MP decoder
is then guaranteed to decode the puncturing in linear time
with the blocklength to obtain B˜ [28], and the inverse of
the scrambling matrix is applied to the systematic decoded
bits using (4) to obtain M˜ . Once all packets are known, this
decoder guarantees that M˜ = M .
VI. SECURITY AGAINST WIRETAPPERS
An eavesdropper can decode the data using Bob’s decoder in
Fig. 4 if all packets are obtained error-free. The independence
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Fig. 4. Detailed block diagram of Bob’s decoder. Number and size of blocks
or packets are indicated at each step.
of Qm and Qw, however, prevents Eve from receiving packets
as a function of δ and ǫ, the respective probabilities of erasures
in Qm and Qw. Let Ref be the event that a single packet
is received error-free by at least one eavesdropper after all
retransmissions of the packet requested by any legitimate
receiver have been filled. This section shows the blanket
security effect of our encoder over nearly the entire region
of possible (δ, ǫ) pairs by completely characterizing D for the
system. We first show D to be binomially distributed, and then
provide security results for all scenarios studied as a function
of Ref . Expressions for Ref follow for the wiretap channel
case, the broadcast scenario with m intended receivers, the
case with l collaborating eavesdroppers, and the most general
case with both m legitimate receivers and l collaborating
eavesdroppers. For cases beyond the simple wiretap scenario,
all m legitimate receivers are given access to the feedback
channel, and all l eavesdroppers are restricted to passive status
through authentication on the channel. Retransmissions in the
ARQ protocol are executed only after requests are received
from all legitimate parties.
Since proper design of the encoder was shown to cause
D to have the same realization for every codeword and be
independent of the decoder in Corollary 1, we understand D to
represent the degrees of freedom in every codeword assuming
either the ML or MP decoder for the rest of the paper.
A. General Security Theorems
Lemma 4. The random variable D which governs the number
of degrees of freedom in a received codeword is a scaled
binomial random variable. Thus, for 1 ≤ β ≤ αη,
Pr(D ≥ β) = 1−
⌈β/α⌉−1∑
i=0
(
η
i
)
(1− Pr(Ref ))
i Pr(Ref )
η−i.
(6)
Proof: By definition, packets are erased for eavesdroppers
with probability (1−Pr(Ref )). Since there are η independent
Bernoulli trials, each identically distributed, the sum of erased
packets |Rp| is a binomial random variable with parameters
η and (1− Pr(Ref )) [41]. Then, by Corollary 3, D = α|Rp|
where α bits from every codeword are sorted into each packet.
Thus, D is a scaled binomial random variable; specifically
D ∼ Bin(η, 1 − Pr(Ref ))α. Since D = α|Rp|, then D ≥ β
implies that α|Rp| ≥ β. Clearly, this requires that |Rp| ≥
⌈β/α⌉. The result in (6) follows directly.
The expected value is therefore known due to the binomial
structure of D. We also prove an important property in regards
to E[D].
Theorem 1. If |R| = N − k in the encoder, then k/n = 1,
and E[D] = H(X |Z) = (1 − Pr(Ref ))n.
Proof: Since |R| = N −k, then n = |Q| = N −|R| = k.
Let us consider the model for a single codeword (L = 1). We
can then assume η independent uses of a PEC with packets of
length α. Let X be the input to the channel, and Z the output,
where α bits are erased with probability (1 − Pr(Ref )) or
received error-free with probability Pr(Ref ) with each channel
use. The input distribution on α bits is uniform because the
input distribution on M is uniform, and the encoding function
of rate one forms a bijection on k bits. Thus, H(X) = α.
Clearly H(Z|X) = H(1 − Pr(Ref )), and H(Z) = H(1 −
Pr(Ref )) + Pr(Ref )α (see [37], pg. 188). Then,
H(X |Z) = H(Z|X)−H(Z) +H(X) (7)
= α(1 − Pr(Ref )). (8)
Therefore, with η independent uses of the channel (one for
each packet), H(X |Z) = (1−Pr(Ref ))ηα = (1−Pr(Ref ))n.
Since the mean of a binomial random variable is the product of
its two parameters, E[D/α] = (1−Pr(Ref ))η, and therefore
E[D] = (1 − Pr(Ref ))ηα = (1− Pr(Ref ))n. (9)
Thus we see that E[D] is equal to the information-theoretic
value of equivocation when the puncturing is accomplished so
that |R| = N−k. Therefore, perfect secrecy is obtained when
E[D] = k. Of course, this occurs when Pr(Ref ) = 0, which
implies that the eavesdropper obtains zero packets. Thus, this
scheme cannot achieve perfect secrecy. However, it can be
shown using the achievable rates in [4] that E[D] approaches
the maximum achievable equivocation for k/n = 1. These
results now require expressions for Pr(Ref ) to complete the
security characterization in D.
B. One Receiver and One Wiretapper
The simplest case matches the setup given in Fig. 1, and
was originally proved in [11].
Lemma 5 (Harrison, et. al. [11]). In the wiretap channel
scenario with feedback, the probability that Eve obtains a
single transmitted packet is given as
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ǫ
1− ǫδ
. (10)
Intuition of security for the wiretap channel in terms of D
can be gained by using the expression for Pr(Ref ) in (10)
to plot (6) for different values of β, α, and η. Fig. 5 shows
Pr(D ≥ 1) for η = 100. Note that when β = 1, α is not
required to evaluate (6). This case is provided to show the
plateau and falloff regions in the (δ, ǫ) grid for Pr(D ≥ β).
Throughout the plateau region, stopping sets occur in the MP
decoder and the ML decoder has linearly dependent columns
in HK¯ with probability very close to one. The results of
Lemmas 4 and 5 give Pr(D ≥ 1) = 1−
(
1−ǫ
1−ǫδ
)η
, which can
be examined in the limit as η →∞. It is immediate that except
for when δ = 1 or ǫ = 0, Pr(D ≥ 1) goes to one for all (δ, ǫ)
pairs as η gets large. From Theorem 1, if |R| = N − k, then
90
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.5
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ǫ δ
Pr(D ≥ 1) with η = 100
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Fig. 6. Pr(D ≥ 1) when η = 5000, as a function of the respective erasure
probabilities in Qm and Qw, δ and ǫ.
η = nα =
k
α . Clearly η grows with k; therefore, the probability
of security approaches one as k gets large. Since large k
necessitates large n and N , the same holds true for these
blocklength parameters. Codes with blocklength N = 10, 000
are deemed practical by today’s standards. For α = 1 and for
a carefully chosen R with size roughly 5000, then η ≈ 5000.
This case is shown in Fig. 6, where as expected, all nontrivial
(δ, ǫ) pairs show Pr(D ≥ 1) ≈ 1.
But of course, a single degree of freedom is easily guessed
in an attack. Let us examine the effects on security when β
takes on a larger value. This perspective is provided in Fig. 7,
where η = 5000 and β = 50 with α = 1. As can be seen in the
figure, there exists a cutoff region, where (δ, ǫ) pairs within the
plateau region will experience at least β degrees of freedom
with probability very close to one, while pairs outside the
region will have D < β with probability close to one. Owing
to the severity of the cutoff, the threshold can be approximated
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Fig. 7. Pr(D ≥ 50) when α = 1 and η = 5000, as a function of the
respective erasure probabilities in Qm and Qw , δ and ǫ.
by setting Pr(D ≥ β) = 0.5 in (6), and deriving a function of
δ and ǫ. This technique provides a unique threshold for each
specific set of values for β, α, and η.
Finally, let us inspect the E[D] according to Theorem 1 for
this case.
E[D] =
ǫ(1− δ)
1− ǫδ
ηα =
ǫ(1− δ)
1− ǫδ
n. (11)
This function grows linearly with n which is equal to k when
|R| = N − k. Thus, to drive D to a large number in practice,
we simply must use a larger dimension in the encoder. Note
that in the expectation the choice of α does not affect security;
although, α = 1 allows η to be as large as possible, which
provides more confidence that D ≈ E[D] by the law of large
numbers ([41], pg. 193).
C. Multiple Intended Receivers
In this section, we move past the single user case, and ad-
dress the more general broadcast channel originally presented
in [42]. There is also a single eavesdropper with probability
of an erased packet equal to ǫ as before. This case allows us
to understand the repercussions on security of having more
than one user for which we allow feedback requests. We can
characterize security using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1 in the
m user case by finding an expression for Pr(Ref ). Recall
that Ref is the event that Eve receives a single transmitted
packet as before. Let each user have an independent PEC
with probability of erasure in the ith user’s channel as δi for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. The following lemma is necessary to obtain
Pr(Ref ).
Lemma 6. If Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm are independent geometri-
cally distributed random variables with success parameters
λ1, λ2, . . . , λm, and Tm = max(Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm), then the
probability mass function on Tm is given as
fm(t) =
m∏
i=1
(1 − (1− λi)
t)−
m∏
j=1
(1− (1 − λi)
t−1). (12)
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Proof: The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity, but
follows from an inductive assumption on m.
Armed with this lemma, we can obtain Pr(Ref ) for the
broadcast channel case.
Lemma 7. Using the broadcast channel with m independent
legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper
Pr(Ref ) =
m∑
i=1
(
1− ǫ
1− ǫδi
)
−
∑
i<j
(
1− ǫ
1− ǫδiδj
)
+
∑
i<j<k
(
1− ǫ
1− ǫδiδjδk
)
− · · ·+
(−1)m+1
(
1− ǫ
1−
∏m
i=1 δi
)
where the notation i < j means the summation traverses over
all pairs (i, j) such that i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and i < j, and
similarly for i < j < k, etc.
Proof: Note that if the ith user requests a single packet
until it is received, and in each transmission it is received
with probability δi, then the total number of times the user
must request the packet is governed by a geometric ran-
dom variable with success parameter 1 − δi [41]. Define
W1,W2, . . . ,Wm as the geometric random variables govern-
ing the total number of transmissions necessary for users
1, 2, . . . ,m, respectively, to obtain the packet error-free. Then,
let W = max(W1,W2, . . . ,Wm). W governs the total number
of transmissions necessary for all legitimate parties to receive
the packet.
By Lemma 6, we know that
Pr(W = w) =
m∏
i=1
(1− δwi )−
m∏
j=1
(1− δw−1i ) (13)
because the success parameter for Wi is 1 − δi for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m. Finally, we point out that
m∏
i=1
(1−δi) = 1−
m∑
i=1
δi+
∑
i<j
δiδj−
∑
i<j<k
δiδjδk+· · · (−1)
m
m∏
i=1
δi
(14)
which implies that
Pr(W = w) =

1− m∑
i=1
δwi +
∑
i<j
(δiδj)
w − · · ·+
(−1)m(
m∏
i=1
δi)
w
)
+

−1 + m∑
i=1
δw−1i −
∑
i<j
(δiδj)
w−1 + · · ·+
(−1)m+1(
m∏
i=1
δi)
w−1
)
=
m∑
i=1
δw−1i (1− δi)−
∑
i<j
(δiδj)
w−1(1− δiδj)
+ · · ·+ (−1)m+1(
m∏
i=1
δi)
w−1(1−
m∏
i=1
δi).
With these pieces in place, we commence proving the
lemma.
Pr(Ref ) =
∞∑
w=1
Pr(Ref |W = w) Pr(W = w)
=
∞∑
w=1
(1− ǫw)

 m∏
i=1
(1− δwi )−
m∏
j=1
(1− δw−1i )


=
∞∑
w=1
(1− ǫw)
(
m∑
i=1
δw−1i (1− δi)−∑
i<j
(δiδj)
w−1(1− δiδj) + · · ·
+ (−1)m+1(
m∏
i=1
δi)
w−1(1−
m∏
i=1
δi)
)
=
m∑
i=1
1− δi
δi
∞∑
w=1
(1− ǫw)δwi −
∑
i<j
1− δiδj
δiδj
∞∑
w=1
(1− ǫw)(δiδj)
w + · · ·
+(−1)m+1
1−
∏m
i=1 δi∏m
i=1 δi
∞∑
w=1
(1− ǫw)(
m∏
i=1
δi)
w
=
m∑
i=1
1− δi
δi
(
∞∑
w=0
δwi −
∞∑
w=0
(ǫδi)
w
)
−
m∑
i<j
1− δiδj
δiδj
(
∞∑
w=0
(δiδj)
w −
∞∑
w=0
(ǫδiδj)
w
)
+ · · ·+ (−1)m+1
1−
∏m
i=1 δi∏m
i=1 δi
×(
∞∑
w=0
(
m∏
i=1
δi)
w −
∞∑
w=0
(ǫ
m∏
i=1
δi)
w
)
=
m∑
i=1
(
1− ǫ
1− ǫδi
)
−
m∑
i<j
(
1− ǫ
1− ǫδiδj
)
+ · · ·+
(−1)m+1
(
1− ǫ
1−
∏m
i=1 δi
)
. (15)
D. Collaborating Eavesdroppers
In this section we consider the case with l eavesdrop-
pers working together in order to obtain the cryptogram M ,
each with a possibly unique probability of packet erasure
ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫl. All are assumed to obtain packets through inde-
pendent PECs. It is simpler to first consider a single legitimate
user Bob with probability of packet erasure δ. Then the general
result which assumes m friendly parties with l collaborating
eavesdroppers comes easily.
Lemma 8. For l eavesdroppers and a single legitimate re-
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ceiver,
Pr(Ref ) =
1−
∏l
i=1 ǫi
1− δ
∏l
i=1 ǫi
. (16)
Proof: The proof is straightforward if we note that
collaborating eavesdroppers receive a single sent packet if at
least one of them obtains the packet error-free. Let W be
a geometric random variable with success parameter 1 − δ.
This governs the number of transmissions for each packet.
Therefore,
Pr(Ref ) =
∞∑
w=1
Pr(Ref |W = w) Pr(W = w)
=
∞∑
w=1
(1− (
l∏
i=1
ǫi)
w)(1− δ)δw−1
=
1− δ
δ
(
∞∑
w=0
δw − (δ
l∏
i=1
ǫi)
w
)
=
1−
∏l
i=1 ǫi
1− δ
∏l
i=1 ǫi
. (17)
This answer provides an easy bridge to an extremely general
result.
Corollary 2. For the scenario with m intended parties and l
eavesdroppers with similar notation as before,
Pr(Ref ) = (1− ǫ
′)

 m∑
i=1
1
1− ǫ′δi
−
∑
i<j
1
1− ǫ′δiδj
+ · · ·+
(−1)m+1
1
1− ǫ′
∏m
i=1 δi
)
, (18)
where ǫ′ =
∏l
i=1 ǫi.
Proof: This proof is not included for the sake of brevity,
but is nearly identical to the proof of Lemma 7 with slight
alterations as indicated by the proof of Lemma 8 to allow for
multiple eavesdroppers.
VII. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS
The probabilistic security analysis in Section VI assumes
that attacks on the cryptography become more difficult or
completely infeasible as D gets large. It remains to show the
effect of the coding scheme on attacks of the cryptography.
As an example, fast correlation attacks on stream ciphers are
known to be possible, even if the cryptogram is error-prone. It
was noted in [8], [9], [10] that specific attacks from [7] were
made more difficult, and in some cases impossible due to error
rates in the cryptogram beyond a certain threshold. Certainly
as bit error rates approach 0.5 in the cryptogram, attacks of
the fast-correlation variety break down completely.
Let Pˆ = (pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆL) be the collection of punctured
codewords obtained by Eve, where pˆi = (pˆi1, pˆi2, . . . , pˆin),
and let Bˆ = (bˆ1, bˆ2, . . . , bˆL) be the decoded codewords,
where bˆi = (bˆi1, bˆi2, . . . , bˆiN). Finally, define the implied block
structure of Eve’s decoder output as Mˆ = (mˆ1, mˆ2, . . . , mˆL),
where mˆi = (mˆi1, mˆi2, . . . , mˆik). Each channel-erased bit in pˆi
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Fig. 8. The simulated error rates in Eve’s decoded cryptogram Mˆ when γ
errors are made in guessing bit values for D degrees of freedom in Eve’s
received codewords.
yields a degree of freedom in bˆi, and complete recovery of
bˆi requires that D bits in pˆi be guessed correctly. If a guess
is incorrect, there will be at least as many errors in bˆi as
the minimum distance of the LDPC code. The descrambling
process in (4) magnifies any errors in bˆi to an expected bit
error rate of 0.5 in mˆi. Therefore, since all guesses are equally
likely, a brute-force attack on D bits must be accomplished to
obtain each mˆi.
Simulations of the end-to-end encoder and decoder clearly
indicate the expected bit error rate in Mˆ of 0.5 for an incorrect
guess. Simulations were performed using the irregular LDPC
code of Example 1 with N = 1000 and k = 500. Puncturing
patterns used were such that |R| ≥ 498 bits. S was formed
randomly by setting roughly half of the k2 entries equal to one
until such a matrix was invertible using the LU decomposition
in GF(2). Let γ be the number of bits in Eve’s guess which are
incorrect. We offer simulation results for γ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10,
15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 200, 300, and 400 in
Fig. 8. Each γ value was tested 300 times on both the MP and
ML decoder, while a new puncturing pattern R was generated
every 10 experiments, and a new code from the ensemble was
selected every 30 experiments. All tests produced error rates
in between 0.414 and 0.578 in Mˆ , while the mean depicted a
0.5002 bit error rate with no noticeable difference between MP
and ML decoders, or between γ values, as Fig. 8 indicates.
These results imply that unless D bits are guessed exactly,
the cryptography must be attacked with an average bit error
rate of 0.5 in Mˆ . We can certainly expect such an attack to fail
for fast correlation attacks on stream ciphers, but the notion
that any attack on a cryptosystem could absorb such error rates
and still succeed is obviously shortsighted. However, since an
attack could feasibly be staged using a single block of Mˆ , we
will only guarantee failure of the attack if every block in Mˆ is
incorrect. Using similar logic, it can be said that if an attack
would succeed using the error-free ciphertext M , then it may
fail even if a single block in Mˆ is in error.
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Theorem 2. Define the complexity of a cryptographic attack
to be CA. Let D be the degrees of freedom of each of L blocks
in Bˆ. Then the expected complexity CPL of a successful attack
on the system is bounded as
2E[D](1− 2−1/L)CA ≤ CPL ≤ 2
E[D](2−1/L)CA. (19)
Proof: By Corollary 1 each codeword in Bˆ has the same
number of degrees of freedom. Thus, E[D] is the average
number of bits that must be guessed in each of L punctured
codewords in Pˆ . Assume that an attacker guesses bit patterns
on all codewords in Pˆ simultaneously. The correct bit patterns
of the channel-erased bits in the L codewords Pˆ are uniformly
distributed over 2E[D] possibilities in each block. The lower
bound is formulated by the expected number of guesses until
at least one of L codewords is found. Model the correct
bit patterns in the L codewords as i.i.d. discrete uniform
random variables on {0, 1, . . . , 2E[D]−1}, say U1, U2, . . . , UL.
Without loss of generality, assume that an attacker begins
by guessing zero for each Ui and proceeds in an orderly
fashion. Then, the expected number of guesses until at least
one is correct is given by E[min(U1, U2, . . . , UL)]. Thus,
we calculate Pr(min(U1, U2, . . . , UL) ≥ z) = Pr(U1 ≥
z,Pr(U2 ≥ z), . . . , UL ≥ z) = (Pr(U1 ≥ z)(Pr(U2 ≥
z) . . . (Pr(UL ≥ z) = (
2E[D] − z
2E[D]
)L
. (20)
Now, solve for z in Pr(min(U1, U2, . . . , UL) ≥ z) = 0.5 for
a close bound on the expectation to get the lower bound.
The upper bound is calculated similarly, but we assume that
all patterns must be guessed in order to guarantee success,
therefore, the bound is given by finding the z that solves
Pr(max(U1, U2, . . . , UL) < z) = 0.5.
As a check on these bounds, for L = 1 we expect 2E[D]−1
guesses on average for a successful attack. In this case, both
bounds meet at 2E[D]−1CA, as expected. Although these
bounds are helpful, when L > 1 the bounds are not as tight,
and thus provide limited insight into the true increase in com-
plexity of the attack. More than likely, an attack will require at
least a certain number of consecutive blocks in M to execute
successfully [7]. Clearly a 0.5 bit error rate in any block
would destroy an attack with these requirements. Therefore,
the upper bound in (19) serves as a good approximation to
the expected amount of work necessary to complete the attack,
with L being set by the attack specifications. Thus we see, that
our system appends a multiplier which is exponential in E[D]
to the complexity of a cryptographic attack through practical
physical-layer security.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have presented the security metric of
degrees of freedom D in an eavesdropper’s received code-
words, and applied this metric to a physical-layer coding
scheme to show cryptographic security enhancements due to
channel coding. The coding scheme relies on the nature of
independent packet erasure channels and ARQ to provide
secrecy and reliability, respectively. End-to-end details of the
encoder and decoder were provided. Design criteria were
specified to maximize D in a maximum-likelihood attack
as well as a message-passing attack. This involved security
performance comparisons of LDPC codes with varying degree
distributions, where irregular codes were shown to outperform
regular codes in maximizing D. The expected value of D
was also shown to be equal to H(X |Z) in our encoder.
Probabilistic security results were obtained and made general
so as to apply to multiple receivers and multiple collaborative
attackers. Simulation results were provided which show that
unless an attacker can guess D symbols in the received data
correctly, the system yields a bit error rate of 0.5 in the
cryptogram, thus necessitating a brute-force attack on D bits
for each codeword. The end result on the expected increase
in attack complexity on the cryptosystem due to our scheme
is a multiplier which is exponential in E[D]. The system
was shown to provide cryptographic security enhancement,
even when eavesdroppers have an advantage over legitimate
receivers in signal quality.
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